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Abstract
Motivated by recent policy events experienced by the European natural gas in-
dustry, this paper develops a simple model for analyzing the interaction between
gas release and capacity investment programs as tools to improve the perfor-
mance of imperfectly competitive markets. We consider a regional market in
which a measure that has an incumbent release part of its gas to a marketer
complements a program of investment in transport capacity dedicated to im-
ports by the marketer, at a regulated transport charge, of competitively-priced
gas. First, we examine the case where transport capacity is regulated while gas
release is not, i.e., the volume of gas released is determined by the incumbent.
We then analyze the effect of the artificial duopoly created by the regulator
when the latter regulates both gas release and transport capacity. Finally, us-
ing information on the French industry, we calibrate the basic demand and cost
elements of the model and perform some simulations of these two scenarios. Be-
sides allowing us to analyze the economic properties of these scenarios, a policy
implication that comes out of the empirical analysis is that, when combined
with network expansion investments, gas-release measures applied under regu-
latory control are indeed effective short-term policies for promoting gas-to-gas
competition.
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1 Introduction
In 1998, the European Union launched a major liberalization reform of its gas
industry which was compound of an oligopoly of public companies, such as the
French GDF, semi-public companies, such as the Italian SNAM, and private
companies, such as the Germans E.ON RUHRGAS and BEB. Prior to this
reform, with the exception of the United Kingdom that initiated the liberaliza-
tion of its energy sector in the 80s, national gas monopolies ensured gas supply
through long-term contracts signed with major oil and gas companies from pro-
ducing countries. This historical situation has made uneasy the introduction
of upstream gas-to-gas competition in the EU Member countries. Indeed, to
ensure that the opening of markets lead to well-functioning and effective com-
petition, new entrants must not only have fair and efficient access to networks
and consumers, but also to gas supply and flexibility services. The fact that the
European gas market was almost entirely supplied through long-term contracts
constituted a potential entry barrier to new actors, and hence a possible imped-
iment to competition. With inadequate access to the gas commodity and lack
of liquidity, spot markets couldn't be expected to develop smoothly.
To improve the situation, the European Commission has advocated the set-
ting up of gas-release programs whereby incumbent operators sell a share of their
gas supplied through long-term contracts, or even all of their long-term contracts
(as in Italy), to potential competitors in order to encourage entry of new sup-
pliers. These programs are meant to resolve short-term problems related to
inadequate access to supply and/or capacity. Often suggested by governments,
following the EC Directive 98/30, or by competition authorities, as a condition
for approving mergers involving the incumbent, the implementation of these
short-term measures in major European countries has been generally justified
on two grounds. First, by bringing in gas-to-gas competition, these gas-release
programs were expected to affect in a significant way the industry's market
structure that was typically organized under a vertically integrated form.1 This
1We are assuming here that when a firm signs a long-term contract with a gas-producing
foreign country, from the perspective of the home country's market, it is as if it controls
production.
2
was the case in France, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Second, these
programs were viewed as corrective measures following the creation through
concentration of a dominant operator at a national level. This was for example
the case in Austria and Germany. Applied in European countries during a pe-
riod ranging from 2 to 10 years, these measures involved an average of about 2
to 3% of total supply in a single country.
Despite the large popularity of gas-release programs as a means of bringing
competition into the natural gas industry, the academic literature that analyzes
their economic impact is strikingly thin.2 For the purpose of this paper, we
should mention Chaton et al. (2008) who focus on gas release as a regulatory
instrument and Clastres and David (2009) who examine the behavior of an
incumbent subject to asymmetric regulation of the gas-release measures type
discussed above. Also, concerned with the liberalization of European gas mar-
kets, Cremer and Laffont (2002), Cremer et al. (2003), Gasmi et al. (2005),
Gasmi and Oviedo (2005, 2010) focus on transport capacity as the sole instru-
ment used to enhance competition and security of supply.3 While these papers
are concerned with the important policy objective of promoting competition in
the natural gas industry, they exclusively consider gas release or capacity in-
vestment as regulatory instruments. This paper analyzes the efficiency of these
two instruments when the regulator may use them simultaneously. It also seeks
to highlight the mechanism through which these two instruments interplay.
The plan of this paper is as follows. The next section describes some repre-
sentative European experiences with gas-release programs. Section 3 presents
the basic ingredients of our theoretical model in which gas release and transport
capacity are instruments that can be used by the regulator to foster competi-
tion. While transport capacity is always assumed to be a regulated activity,
section 4 considers the scenario where the decision of how much gas to release
is under the control of/decentralized to the incumbent gas supplier. Section 5
considers then the scenario where the gas-release and investment activities are
2In contrast, there exists a large institutional literature on the subject that has essentially
come out of the European Union.
3We should also mention the work of Sannarnes (2007) which is concerned with investment
mechanisms as tools to optimally design the transport capacity network.
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both regulated. Section 6 presents and discusses the results of some calibration
and simulation exercises aimed at comparing the optimal policies under the two
scenarios. Section 7 summarizes the main arguments and findings of the paper
and points to some directions for further research.
2 European gas-release experiences
In Europe, gas-release programs have often been appended to a set of regulatory
measures of an asymmetric nature aimed at reducing the market share of the
incumbent. This type of regulation was first implemented in the UK in 1992 with
the objective of reducing the 60% market share possessed by British Gas (BG)
in the industrial and commercial segment between 1992 and 1995. Since then,
it has been adopted elsewhere as an instrument to facilitate the introduction
of competition. In Spain, since January 1, 2003, the law requires that the
supply of any single operator do not represent more than 70% of the total
consumption in the country. In Italy, the Decree No. 164/2000 stipulates that
during the period running from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2010 the sales
to final consumers of any single operator cannot be more than 50% of the annual
domestic gas consumption. Moreover, since January 1, 2002, no single operator
can inject into the transport network a volume representing more than 75% of
annual gas consumption, this percentage annually decreasing by 2% to reach
61% by December 31, 2010.
While the lessons to be drawn from the introduction of gas-release programs
in Europe are mixed, these experiences highlight the importance of the design of
the auction mechanisms through which the programs are implemented, in par-
ticular, the process by which price, quantity, and duration are determined. Gas
release has certainly gained in interest following the success of the UK program.
According to the organizers of these programs and the authorities in charge of
competition, the UK program has substantially contributed to the development
of gas-to-gas competition prior to October 1998 when new transport capacity
was deployed.4 This program has also strengthened measures aimed at decreas-
4The NBP spot market has indeed developed rapidly over the period during which the
asymmetric regulation was implemented. This period was followed by the commissioning
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ing market power in the sector such as the 90/10 rule that had BG commit to
contract for no more than 90% of the volume of the new fields in the North sea,
leaving up to 10% of this volume to other firms.
In the UK, the volumes of gas released were allocated proportionally to
the number of participating suppliers which were about 32 in the first year
and 102 in the second. In Spain, after being auditioned by the Ministry of
Economy, potential participants to the gas-release program were selected on the
basis of their commitment to contribute to efforts to liberalize the Spanish gas
market and to stimulate competition in this sector in the short, medium, and
long term. The volumes were then allocated according to the order book. The
quantities were allocated through negotiations among partners in Italy, auctions
in Germany and Austria, and both auctions and over-the-counter contracts in
France.
The Spanish government conducted a gas-release program for 25% of gas
imports from Algeria that started in October 2001 and ended on January 1,
2004. Then, the contracts were turned over to GAS NATURAL/ENAGAS. The
total retrocession amounted to 48.76 Terawatt-hours (TWh) per Gross Calorific
Value (GCV) representing 11% of total supplies to the Spanish market and 15%
of the eligible market. Participation to the auctions was made conditional on
submission of sales forecasts and plans to secure diversified gas supplies once
the gas-release program had come to an end. The average price was set equal
to the gas purchasing cost, i.e., the oil-indexed price of gas, to which a fixed
management fee is added. Overall, however, this gas-release program had only
a modest impact in comparison with the substantial increase of natural gas
demand and the lowering of the eligibility threshold.
In Italy, starting in January 2002 and until December 2010, the incum-
bent operator SNAM/ENI had to release 39% of its gas contracted out under
long-term conditions. This gas-release program was combined with additional
measures to reduce individual firms' market shares. So, for example, no opera-
tor could sell gas, through its parent companies or its subsidiaries, to customers
of the Interconnector pipe which is a sub-sea gas pipeline linking the UK with continental
Europe. This pipeline provided a strategic bi-directional link between the UK and Continental
European energy markets.
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whose consumption represented more than 50% of the annual domestic gas net
(of won) consumption. These measures that imposed quotas on imports and
sales were often bypassed by SNAM/ENI.5 This gas-release program has essen-
tially benefited the power companies ENEL and EDISON. In 2004, the Italian
regulatory and competition authorities unveiled an abuse of dominant position
by ENI that led these authorities to set a program whereby ENI would release
105.8 TWh of gas per year during the period 2004-2008.
The German gas-release program was launched in July 2003 and the first
deliveries went through in October of the same year. As a condition for the
approval of the merger of E.ON and RUHRGAS, the German government ob-
tained a commitment from E.ON RUHRGAS to release 213.9 TWh of gas in
six annual auctions on the first of October, amounting to an average of 35.65
TWh available monthly through auctions over a three-year period. The German
system of retrocession is a biding mechanism with a reserve price equal to 95%
of the imported gas price. At the first auction, the gas was sold in the form of
33 lots and no participant could buy more than 11 lots. However, more than
half of the lots had no takers. The market experienced a low participation rate
because of poor transportation conditions, a high minimum bid, and important
asymmetric information between E.ON RUHRGAS and the regulator on various
dimensions of supply. E.ON RUHRGAS has benefited from an annuity on the
gas-release program.
To counter the potential adverse effect on gas-to-gas competition stimulation
of the German experience and following an agreement between the Ministry and
E.ON RUHRGAS to meet after the first bid to discuss possible modifications,
amendments were made to the auction mechanism. These changes took into
consideration the auction participants' requests mainly related to the minimum
bid level (participants could evaluate in advance the price and hedge against
price risk), the contractual daily requirement (the volume the seller/buyer agrees
to deliver/take at the delivery point during the delivery period), and the volume
obligation guaranteed by the auction (reduced by 50%).
As a condition for the approval of the merger of OMV and the gas activities
5For example, ENI had invested in combined cycle gas turbine technology and had mini-
mized the quantities of gas it had to release.
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of ENERGIE ALLIANZ that led to the creation of ECONGAS, the Austrian
competition authority launched a gas-release program in 2002. In July 2003,
ECONGAS auctioned off 2.86 TWh of natural gas. ECONGAS held its second
online auction for the same volume of gas in July 2004 and its third for a
volume of 3.11 TWh in July 2005. An important aspect of the Austrian gas
regulatory policy is that, although the incumbent has to release 20% of its gas
imported through long-term contracts until 2008, the price of the released gas
is determined solely by the auction and ECONGAS has no obligation to sell if
such a price is below cost. While this gas-release program has counterbalanced
to some extent the impact of the creation of ECONGAS and has contributed to
the development of the Baumgarten hub, it has not really stimulated gas-to-gas
competition.
Despite the mitigated experiences of gas-release programs, such measures
have occupied the European scene. On September 20, 2006, SUEZ and Gaz de
France (GDF) offered the European Commission to take part in a gas-release
program in France and Belgium in return to their merging. On November 14,
2006, the EC decided not to impose the program. In Denmark, as part of the
reorganization of the gas sector previously under the monopoly of the incum-
bent DONG ENERGY for the purchase of domestic production, the Danish
competition authority and the EC requested that this company cess buying gas
from the DUC, the sole Danish producer, as long as the latter hasn't sold 77
TWh to alternative operators. The period covered by this program runs from
2005 to 2010.
As in the case of the British program, the French experience suggests that,
although widely used, gas release is mainly a transitory instrument to enhance
competition in gas markets. Concerned with limited competition in France, in
particular, in the Southern part of the country, the French energy regulator, the
Commission de Régulation de l'Energie (CRE), has approved the gas-release
program proposed by GDF and TOTAL at the time the transportation network
had to be restructured in 2004. This 3-year program started in January 2005.
During this period, GDF pledged to sell 15 TWh per year through auctions
and over-the-counter contracts and TOTAL to make available 1.1 TWh per
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year through auctions. Although the released volume only represented 3.5%
of the sales of GDF and the regional operator GAZ DU SUD OUEST, the
CRE has argued that these temporary supplies should allow new marketers
to enter the Southern market where the current situation is simply ... no
competition. Moreover, the CRE trusted that by the first half of 2009 the
latest, new infrastructures, such as the second liquefied natural gas terminal,
the Fos-2 LNG terminal, and that, by the beginning of 2009, more pipeline
interconnection points with the Spanish transport network should enable these
new entrants to secure their own longer-term supplies.6
The totality of the quantities offered were sold (CRE, 2006). Sixteen compa-
nies have participated in auctions held by GDF and 12 lots representing a total
of 6 TWh were sold. These lots were acquired by the Belgium-based subsidiary
of the Italian ENI, DISTRIGAS, the Spanish GAS NATURAL, and the French
TOTAL. In addition, GDF has sold 9 TWh over the counter to the British BP,
DISTRIGAS, GAS NATURAL, and the French power company EDF. Eight
companies have participated in the auctioning of 1.1 TWh in 10 lots by TO-
TAL. Only 5 of the 10 lots, representing a total of 0.55 TWh, were acquired
by EDF and the Spanish power company IBERDROLA at the reserve price set
by TOTAL. The remaining 0.55 TWh were sold over the counter by TOTAL
to DISTIGAS. A year after its launching, the French gas-release program has
allowed three foreign suppliers to compete with the incumbents in the southern
French market. Nevertheless, the CRE considers that competition is still too
limited (CRE, 2006).
On November 22, 2007, the CRE has published its analysis of the gas-release
program following the public hearing launched on July 10 of the same year. The
gas-release program has been the main supply of gas from diversified sources in
the south and the southwest regions of France. However, the upstream segment
of the French industry (imports and production) has not changed much. Besides
the fact that GDF and TOTAL hold the major part of entry capacity, in 2006,
88% of imported gas in France was done by GDF and 6% by TOTAL. The
CRE reports that 57% of the gas-release volume in the south and 92% in the
6The Fos-2 LNG terminal opened on June 23, 2009.
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southwest have been marketed to final customers. Purchasers of this gas have
resold the residual volumes in the wholesale market or at the French border
either because of difficulties to compete with incumbents in the French retail
market or to benefit from high prices in the northern European markets.
Since the introduction of the gas-release measures, the size of the French
market, opened to competition on July 1, 2007 has increased by about 40 to
50%, from 370 to 520 TWh per year. The CRE considers that in the medium
term, the development of new infrastructures will not fully compensate the
loss of volumes sold under the gas-release program in the south and southwest
regions. To maintain a sufficient level of competition and ensure the continuity
of supply from alternative sources, the CRE seeks to establish new gas release
measures on January 1, 2009 when some lots come to expiration. Given the
increase in the size of the market for eligible customers, the programs represent
at least 15% of consumption in both regions, which now represents about 21
TWh per year for the southern zone (essentially supplied by GDF-SUEZ) and
6 TWh per year for the southwest (supplied by GDF-SUEZ and TOTAL).
The CRE finds it necessary to adjust the programs so that there are regular
allowances (at least once a year), the duration of the portfolio of contracts is ex-
tended from 1 to 3 years, and the anonymity of the participants to the programs
is respected. However, in order to determine whether or not further gas-release
programs need to be implemented in France as the CRE recommended, the
evaluation of the market power of GDF-SUEZ and TOTAL, taking account
of current and future network capacities, ought to be updated. Indeed, since
the 2007 evaluation, GDF-SUEZ has committed to reduce its long-term import
capacities.7
7Following an antitrust case filled by the EC in May 2008 against GDF-SUEZ, this
operator has made some commitments that are currently under debate. The EC ar-
gues that ..these commitments could have a major structural impact on the ability
of alternative operators to enter the French market for the benefit of both residen-
tial and industrial gas consumers. (see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction and
http://europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/39316/proposed_commitments.pdf)
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3 Basic ingredients of the model
This section presents the basic ingredients of a simple model that we use to
analyze gas-release and capacity-investment policies. Consider a regional gas
market, market M , dominated by an incumbent firm (firm I) that buys gas
from producers through long-term contracts. Let p(·) represent the market
inverse demand function, CI(·) the incumbent's variable cost function, and FI
its fixed cost. Under this monopolistic market structure the incumbent's profit
function is ΠI = p(qm)× qm −CI(qm)− FI where qm is quantity of gas sold in
the market. This profit-maximizing incumbent firm exercises then its market
power according to the standard inverse-elasticity rule (p− C ′I)/p = 1/ε.8
To stimulate competition in this regional gas market, a regulator may give
incentives to a transporter (firm T ) to invest in pipelines that will allow imports
of gas from a competitive market, market C.9 Clearly though, building new
pipelines can only be a middle- to long-term objective. Meanwhile, in order
to improve the efficiency of this regional market, the regulator can create an
artificial duopoly by requiring that the regional monopolist sell or release to
a marketer (firm R) a fraction, α say, of its supply through long-term contracts
at a unit price pR.
These two measures, namely, capacity investment and gas release, may co-
exist. Indeed, the regulator has the opportunity to introduce competition by
complementing the gas-release program with investments in transport capacity
K dedicated to imports of natural gas acquired under competitive conditions in
market C. Under these circumstances, the gas supplied by the marketer comes
from two alternative sources and is composed of gas released by the incumbent
at a cost pR, in volume qR, and gas imported from market C, in volume K, at
a cost (c + pK), where c is the competitive price of shipped gas and pK is the
regulated transport charge of this gas.10
The total quantity sold in market M , qm, is thus composed of the gas di-
8As an illustration, assuming the functional forms p(qm) = γ − qm, CI(qm) = θqm, γ > θ
that will be used later, this rule yields qm = (γ − θ)/2 and ΠI = (γ − θ)2/4− Fm, requiring
FI ≤ (γ − θ)2/4 for the firm's profits to be nonnegative.
9Market C might represent a competitive production area or a spot market.
10This transport charge is meant to represent the Third Party Access (TPA) charge.
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rectly supplied to the final consumers by the incumbent, qI , the gas provided
by the marketer which is gas released by the incumbent, qR, and the gas di-
rectly provided by the marketer through imports, K. These volumes satisfy the
following identities:
qm = qI + qR +K (1)
qR = α(qm −K) (2)
qI = (1− α)(qm −K) (3)
We assume that the incumbent's variable cost CI(·) is separable into the cost
of gas dedicated to final consumption, CII (·) and the cost of gas released to the
marketer, CRI (·).11 Under this duopolistic market structure, the incumbent's
profit function is thus given by
ΠI = p(qI + qR +K)qI + pRqR − CII (qI)− CRI (qR)− FI (4)
The profit function of the marketer is given by
ΠR = p(qI + qR +K)(qR +K)− pRqR − (c+ pK)K (5)
and that of the regulated transporter by
ΠT = pKK − CT (K)− FT (6)
where CT (K) is the variable cost of the transporter and FT its fixed cost.12
Finally, the net consumers surplus CS is given by
CS = S(qI + qR +K)− p(qI + qR +K)(qI + qR +K) (7)
where S(·) represents gross consumer surplus, and social welfare W is expressed
as the unweighed sum of ΠI , ΠR, ΠT , and CS given in (4)-(7).
11This separability assumption about the firm's technology may be justified by the fact that
the incumbent has the possibility to renegotiate its long-term contracts. We also assume that
the incumbent's cost function of gas dedicated to final consumption is increasing convex and
twice continuously differentiable with CI′′′I = 0. As to the incumbent's cost function of gas
released to the marketer, CRI , it is merely assumed to be increasing convex.12In this paper, the transport access charge pK is assumed to be exogenous. This charge
might reflect the long-run marginal cost of the whole transport network and not only that of
its regional portion considered here.
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4 Unregulated gas release and regulated capacity
As a preliminary step, let us assume that the gas-release activity is not regulated
while investment in transport capacity is.13 We assume the following sequence
of events. First, the regulator sets capacity K, then the incumbent sets the
gas-release charge pR, and finally the incumbent and the marketer compete à
la Cournot in qI and qR.14 Solving backward, we first consider the output
determination game in which the incumbent maximizes its profit given in (4)
with respect to qI , while the marketer maximizes its profit given in (5) with
respect to qR. The first-order conditions of this Cournot game are
∂ΠI
∂qI
= p+ qIp′ − CI′I (qI) = 0 (8)
∂ΠR
∂qR
= p+ (qR +K)p′ − pR = 0 (9)
These conditions implicitly define a couple of output functions that depend
on the gas-release charge and capacity, q˜I(pR,K) and q˜R(pR,K). Before pro-
ceeding on to solve the next stages, we give a lemma that provides us with useful
expressions for the slopes of these supply functions.15
Lemma 1. The supply functions q˜I(pR,K) and q˜R(pR,K) satisfy
dq˜I
dpR
= − 1
3p′ − 2CI′′I
dq˜R
dpR
=
2p′ − CI′′I
p′[3p′ − 2CI′′I ]
dq˜I
dK
= 0
d2q˜I
dp2R
=
2CI
′′′
I
3p′ − 2CI′′I
[
dq˜I
dpR
]2
= 0
d2q˜R
dp2R
= − C
I
′′′
I
3p′ − 2CI′′I
[
dq˜I
dpR
]2
= 0
dq˜R
dK
= −1
13This scenario might be seen as representing the 2005-2008 period during which, in France,
GDF volunteered to pledge to auction-off gas (see section 2).
14Recall that investments in capacity are dedicated to the marketer.
15The proof of this lemma involves standard calculus and is available from the authors upon
request. However, it is worth mentioning here that existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
is guaranteed by our assumptions about demand and incumbent's technology. In fact, it
corresponds to the crossing point of the firms' reaction functions derived from (8) and (9).
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This lemma says that, in equilibrium, an increase in the gas-release charge
pR leads to an increase in the incumbent's output qI and a decrease in the
marketer's output qR with a net negative effect on aggregate output.16
Next, these supply functions q˜I(pR,K) and q˜R(pR,K) are substituted back
into the incumbent profit function given in (4) to express it as a function of
pR and K, Π˜I(pR,K). The second stage of the backward resolution algorithm
consists then in maximizing this reduced form profit function with respect to
pR, yielding the following first-order condition:
∂Π˜I(pR,K)
∂pR
= q˜I + 2q˜R +
pR − CR′I
p′
− (p− C
I′
I )− (pR − CR
′
I )
3p′ − 2CI′′I
= 0 (10)
The end result of this profit-maximization problem is a gas-release charge pR
as a function of capacity K, p̂R(K). The next lemma provides some information
on how capacity affects the release charge.
Lemma 2. The equilibrium release-charge function p̂R(K) satisfies
dp̂R
dK
=
p′(3p′ − 2CI′′I )
(2p′ − CI′′I )
− CR′′I (11)
This lemma says that, in equilibrium, an increase in transport capacity K leads
to a strict decrease in the gas-release charge pR which, by the results established
in Lemma 1, implies an unambiguous expansion of aggregate output. Thus, in-
vestment in transport capacity appears to be an effective pro-competitive mea-
sure as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. When gas release is not regulated, investment in capacity is
pro-competitive.
The third and final stage of the backward resolution algorithm requires sub-
stituting the functions obtained in Lemmas 1 and 2 into the social welfare
function to obtain
16This implication corresponds to the general result in Industrial Organization saying that
with strategic substitutes and a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a firm's output decreases
with its marginal cost and increases with its competitor's (Tirole, 1988, p. 220). Moreover,
we find that an increase in a firm's marginal cost decreases industry output.
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W(K) = S(q˜I(pR,K) + q˜R(pR,K) +K)− CII (q˜I(pR,K))− CRI (q˜R(pR,K))
−cK − CT (K)− FI − FT (12)
To find the optimal level of capacity, social welfare is then maximized with
respect to K subject to the profit-maximization constraint of the incumbent
with respect to pR, given in (10), and the transporter's participation constraint
and the incumbent's output nonnegativity constraint respectively given by
ΠT = pKK − CT (K)− FT ≥ 0 (13)
and
qI ≥ 0 (14)
Letting ηR and φT respectively denote the Lagrange multipliers associated
with the incumbent's profit-maximization constraint and the transporter's par-
ticipation constraint and taking into consideration the results of Lemmas 1 and
2 in the respective set of first-order conditions, the next proposition provides a
condition that capacity has to satisfy when gas release is unregulated.
Proposition 2. When transport capacity is regulated and the decision about
how much gas to release is left to a profit-maximizing incumbent, letting ηR and
φT respectively denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the incumbent's
profit-maximization constraint and the transporter's participation constraint, the
following condition characterizes transport capacity:
[c+ C
′
T (K)]− φT [pK − C
′
T (K)] = C
R′
I + ηR (15)
Proposition 2 says that when transport capacity is regulated but gas release
is not, capacity is built up to the point where the net social marginal cost of
bringing gas from the competitive market arising from the marginal cost of im-
ported gas, [c+C ′T (K)], adjusted for the social marginal benefit associated with
the mark-up over the extra unit of imported gas relaxing the transporter's par-
ticipation constraint, φT [pK − C ′T (K)], equates the distorted social marginal
cost of released gas stemming from the marginal cost of one unit of gas released
14
by the incumbent, CR′I , augmented by the marginal contribution of that gas
unit to the incumbent's profit-maximization constraint, ηR.
5 Regulated gas release and capacity
When gas release is also regulated, the timing is as follows. First, the regulator
sets capacity K and the gas-release charge pR. Then, the incumbent and the
marketer compete à la Cournot. Again, solving backward, we first find the
supply functions q˜I(pR,K) and q˜R(pR,K) from the first-order conditions (8)
and (9).17 Then, we substitute these functions back into the social welfare
function to obtain (12).
Note that, since gas release is regulated, the regulator has now to ensure that
the incumbent is willing to participate. Assuming that accounting separation is
imposed, the following constraint thus needs to be taken into account:
pRqR − CRI (qR) ≥ 0 (16)
Social welfare given by (12) is then maximized with respect to pR and K subject
to the transporter and incumbent participation constraints, and the incumbent's
output nonnegativity constraint. The next proposition establishes a condition
that characterizes transport capacity when both capacity and gas release are
regulated.
Proposition 3. When transport capacity and gas release are regulated, letting
φR and φT respectively denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the in-
cumbent's and the transporter's participation constraints, capacity has to satisfy
[c+ C
′
T (K)]− φT [pK − C
′
T (K)] = C
R′
I − φR[pR − CR
′
I ] (17)
Proposition 3 says that when both transport capacity and gas release are
under the control of the regulator, capacity is built up to the point where the
net social marginal cost of bringing gas from the competitive market arising
from the marginal cost of imported gas, [c + C ′T (K)], adjusted for the social
marginal benefit associated with the mark-up over the extra unit of imported
17Note that these supply function satisfy Lemma 1.
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gas relaxing the transporter's participation constraint, φT [pK−C ′T (K)], equates
the net social marginal cost of releasing gas from the incumbent, CR′I , adjusted
by the social marginal benefit associated with the mark-up over that release-gas
unit relaxing the incumbent's participation constraint, φR[pR − CR′I ].
6 The artificial duopoly effect
This section seeks to compare the two scenarios discussed in the previous sec-
tions on the basis of social welfare. What makes such an exercise worthwhile
doing though? Recall that both scenarios assume that transport capacity is
regulated and the first scenario, designated by S1 hereafter, assumes that gas
release is not regulated while the second scenario, noted S2 hereafter, assumes
it is. Intuition suggests that, as the regulatory schemes considered under these
two scenarios are analyzed under complete information, the principle of optimal-
ity should yield a higher social welfare level under the scenario that allows for
an extra regulatory instrument, namely, S2. However, the fact that the down-
stream duopoly, the equilibrium outcome of which the regulator has to account
for when determining the optimal capacity investment policy, is, in some sense,
artificial raises questions about this result.
To be more specific, our empirical exercise here finds its justification in
the presumption that this whole issue boils down to the question of how the
extra regulatory instrument and the artificial duopoly effects on social welfare
aggregate.18 Given these theoretical difficulties and in view of the importance
of gas-release measures from a policy standpoint, we attempt to bring in some
quantitative evidence on how these two effects are reflected in social welfare by
conducting an empirical analysis of scenarios S1 and S2. First, we specify some
functional forms for the basic functions of our theoretical model and calibrate
them using French data (section 6.1). Then, we perform some simulations of
the scenarios and draw some comparisons (section 6.2).19
18Note that we are assuming here that the fact that the duopoly is artificial, in the sense
that is defined in the paper, should affect the economic welfare impact of the standard duopoly
externality due to the fact that some of a firm's profit increases is achieved at the expense of
the other firm's profit decreases.
19Note that the simulations also allow us to check the internal coherence of the scenarios.
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6.1 Calibration
The first function that is needed in order to perform simulations is the inverse
demand function for natural gas. We assume the linear form p(qm) = γ − αqm,
α, γ > 0. Ideally, one would use time-series or cross-sectional data to estimate
the two parameters of this linear demand function. However, given the scarcity
of data and the relatively recent history of the gas industry reforms, we impose
the value of 1 for α and draw on existing econometric demand studies to calibrate
the demand intercept γ.
Since the mid-70s a large econometric literature has developed following the
need to save energy and to target the objectives of energy policies. However,
although this literature has examined demand for various energy sources in both
the residential and industrial sectors, it is mainly concerned with household
demand for electricity and to a lesser extent for natural gas.20
Krichene (2005) has found that in recent years demand for natural gas has
substantially varied and price-elasticity has dropped markedly after 1974. Based
on the more recent surveys by Dahl (2004) and Liu (2004), we take for the price-
elasticity of demand of gas in France the figure 0.56. Given this value of the
elasticity, we calculate a value for the intercept of the inverse demand function,
γ, corresponding to an average level of the British price, e6.522/million BTU,
amounting to e22.25/MWh.21 The value found for the intercept term is then
62. The wholesale price being equal to e3/MWh, we take the price in the
competitive sector, c, to be equal to e29/MWh.
Let us now turn to the calibration of the gas commodity cost function. For
this function, we assume the form CI(qI + qR) = CII (qI) + CRI (qR) + FI =
θIqI + θRqR + FI . As the spot market is not well developed yet, it seems
reasonable to assume that the incumbent obtains gas solely through long-term
contracts. Hence, θIqI can be seen as the variable cost of purchasing gas trough
long-term contracts plus the transport cost of this gas from the source to the
French border. The parameter θI can then be seen as the border price of gas
20For a review of this literature, see Bohi and Zimmerman (1984). Madlener (1996) reviews
the literature concerned with European markets.
21In contrast to France, where regulated prices for final consumers still exist, the UK rates
reflect market prices.
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paid by GDF. We also distinguish between the price paid by this historical
operator for gas to sell to final consumers, θI , from that to make available to
the entrant (the marketer), θR.22
We have used as a value of θI the average border price corresponding to
the long-term contracts binding GDF with Algeria, Norway, and Russia. These
prices have changed over time (CRE, 2008). In late September 2008, prices of
gas supplied through long-term contracts which are relevant to our base case
amounted to e27.95/MWh for Russian gas that entered Germany via Waidhaus,
e29.45/MWh for Algerian gas that entered France via the Montoir-de-Bretagne
terminal, and e30.25/MWh for Norwegian gas that entered Germany via the
Emden terminal. Stable since April 2006, prices of long-term contracts had risen
by about 22% in the second quarter of 2008 and 15% in the third quarter of
2008 before stabilizing at a level never seen before. DGEC-IFP (2008) estimates
the average border price in Europe in October 2008 to e40/MWh, about 15%
above that of the previous month of the same year. DGEC-IFP (2009) shows
that this border price is slightly below e45/MWh in November before starting
to decline.
On the basis of these information, we assume that θI and θR lie somewhere
between e15 and e55/MWh. For simplicity, we assume that FI represents the
transport cost of gas from the border to the final consumer, i.e., the access
charge to the international transport network, and is included in the border
price of gas. For simulation purposes, we assume an initial value of θR equal to
e38.18/MWh and take ∆ ≡ (θI − θR), such that ∆ ∈ (7.02, 14.46).23
Turning to transport technology, it is worth noting that the transport ca-
pacity between the producer and the incumbent is closely tied to the existing
long-term contracts. Consequently, without new investments in transport in-
frastructure an entrant wouldn't have access to the same sources of gas as the
22Note that the discrepancy between these two prices should depend on the relative bar-
gaining power of the operator and the gas suppliers.
23A couple of remarks are worth making. First, note that the assumed values are such
that θR > c, i.e., that there is an efficiency gap between the gas release and the competitive
technologies. Second, the condition ∆ (= θI − θR) > 0 may reflect a situation under which
gas currently contracted under long-term conditions or produced locally is more costly than it
was negotiated or extracted in the past. Thus, this leaves an opportunity for extracting rents
through a gas-release program.
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incumbent. Moreover, even if it succeeds in obtaining gas from another mar-
ket, e.g., a competitive market as in our model, such an entrant is unlikely to
cover the market already supplied by the incumbent. Hence, in order for the
entrant to have access to gas sources and compete with the incumbent, pro-
grams of investment in transport capacity and/or gas-release measures need to
be implemented.
A widely used functional form for the transport variable cost function is
CT (K) = (a+bKβ)L where L is the length of the pipeline. We have normalized
L to 1 and approximated the total transport cost function by the increasing
convex cost function CT (K) + FT = ω2K2 + FT . An examination of French
data has led us to assume that ω ∈ (0.112, 0.156) and FT = 1.746. The TPA
charge pK was estimated from an example provided by the French transport
network managing company GRTgaz for gas that entered France through the
Obergailbach point in the Lorraine region and got delivered in the massif central
region of Auvergne. This estimate amounted to e0.737/MWh.24
6.2 Simulations
Let us recapitulate the results of our French-data-based calibration exercise from
the previous section. The demand function for natural gas in the regional market
dominated by the incumbent is given by p(qm) = 62− qm where quantity is in
MWh and price in e/MWh. The (separable) cost function of the incumbent is
specified as CI(qI+qR) = CII (qI)+CRI (qR) where CII (qI) = θIqI and CRI (qR) =
θRqR are such that θR = 38.18 and the discrepancy between the marginal costs
θI and θR, ∆, expressed in e/MWh, lies in the segment (7.02, 14.46). The cost
of gas imported from the competitive market, c, is equal to e29/MWh and the
cost in euros of transporting K MWh is given by CT (K) + FT = ω2K2 + 1.746,
where ω ∈ (0.112, 0.156). Finally, the transport charge pK is taken to be equal
to e0.737/MWh.
Figures 1-4 below displays the results of the comparison of the two scenarios
S1 and S2 along four dimensions, namely, capacity K, volume of gas released,
qR, consumer surplus, CS, and social welfare, W , for values of ∆ and ω lying
24See http://wwww.grtgaz.com.
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in respectively the segments (7.02, 14.46) and (0.112, 0.156).
Figure 1: Comparison of K
Figure 2: Comparison of qR
20
Figure 3: Comparison of CS
Figure 4: Comparison of W
From Figure 1 we see that for low values of ∆ and ω scenario S1 (unregulated
gas release-regulated capacity) is not feasible in the sense that equation (15)
admits no solution in K. For all other regions of the ∆− ω space, we see that
K1 ≥ K2, i.e., for high ∆ or high ω, optimal capacity is higher when gas release
is not regulated (under S1) than when it is (under S2). In contrast, Figure 2
shows that, except for high values of ∆, the optimal level of gas released by
the incumbent is higher when gas release is regulated (under S2). Moreover, as
21
can be seen from Figures 3 and 4, regulated gas release unambiguously leads to
higher consumer surplus and social welfare.
7 Conclusion
This paper has been motivated by the recent efforts of governments within the
European Union to introduce gas-to-gas competition. Broadly speaking, it is
fair to say that Europe has been largely dependent on a few gas suppliers,
in particular, Algeria, Russia, and Norway. Moreover, national industries have
been historically organized as monopolies that integrated the import, transport,
storage, and final distribution activities. This very concentrated structure of the
European gas industry has made the liberalization reforms look more like what
can be characterized as active asymmetric regulation aimed at establishing a
more balanced share of markets.
Two prominent instruments used to achieve such a goal are gas-release mea-
sures and capacity investment programs. In this paper, we have proposed a
simple model for examining the interaction between these two policies for im-
proving the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We
have assumed that the gas-release measure is complemented by a program of
investment in transport capacity dedicated to the shipping of competitive gas
by a marketer at a regulated transport charge. Calibration and simulation tech-
niques have then been used to evaluate the impact of regulating gas release on
social welfare. Besides allowing us to highlight some of the economic properties
of gas release and capacity investment policies, this exercise brings empirical
evidence on the welfare benefits of regulating gas release. Gas release, when
regulated, is pro-competitive and yields social welfare benefits indeed.
A few directions for further research need to be explored. A first exten-
sion of this work consists in enlarging the set of scenarios to be compared to
include actual policy experiences in the EU. This set would include, among
others, scenarios in which only gas release is available as an instrument to fos-
ter competition (in the spirit of Chaton et al., 2008) and scenarios in which
only capacity is available. A comparative analysis would then provide us with
a richer information on the interaction between a larger set of regulatory in-
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struments and their efficiency from a policy standpoint. A second direction for
further research would be to take into account dynamic effects, in particular, in
the contractual relationship between gas producers and gas suppliers. A third
direction would be to introduce information problems, in particular, to analyze
the social cost of private information of the incumbent on ∆, the discrepancy
between the cost of the gas provided by the incumbent to final consumers, θI ,
and that of the gas released by the incumbent to the marketer, θR. Finally,
it is would be interesting to introduce price discrimination to account for the
heterogeneity of gas consumers.
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